# Maintaining Democratic Values in e-Voting with eVACS®

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#### **Purpose of electronic election systems**

- Improve accuracy
- Faster results
- Reduce costs
- Increase number of people who can vote without assistance in secret
- Reduce potential for fraud or manipulation of votes





# **Supporting democratic principles**

- Equality (in voting)
- Secrecy
- Security
- Transparency





#### eVACS®

- Is more than electronic voting
- Able to incorporate non-electronic votes
- Modular
- "Closed system"






#### Modular

- Set-up election
- Voting
- Entering non-electronic votes
- Counting & Reporting






## **Voting module**








#### **Entering Non-electronic Votes**







## **Counting & Reporting**




**Election results** 





#### **Set-up election**



**Counting software** 





#### "Closed system"

- Set-up election generates software for specific election
  - Cannot be modified by vendor or election officials





#### eVACS® Hardware

- Does not require special equipment
- Can have a mixture of off-the-shelf hardware
- In-built flexibility





## Equality

- Audio
- Multiple languages
- (Special) keypad
- Use in booth or at a table
- Automatic sequencing of numbered preferences





### Secrecy

- Voting screen
- Fits in normal voting booth
- No clues as to how person is voting
  - Keypad navigation
  - Audio via headphones
- Vote 'can be hidden'
- Voting without assistance





## **Security - Software**

- Automated set-up
- Limited functionality
- Installation reformats
- Barcodes
- Only 'completed' votes stored
- Matching keystrokes with voter's choices

- Isolated LAN
- No votes stored on voting machines
- Votes stored on secure server
- Separate databases
- Downloading
- Log of all activities





#### Security - Hardware

- Off-the-shelf equipment
- The ROC





#### Transparency

- Level 1 Code available
- Level 2 Correct operation
- Level 3 Version control
- Level 4 Controlled functionality
- Level 5 Integrity of votes and the electronic audit trail

Any particular level assumes compliance with all lower levels





#### Level 1 - Code Available

- Source code released
- Independent auditing
- Independent verification





## **Level 2 - Correct operation**

- Ballots
- Voting
- Entering non-electronic votes
- Counting
- Reporting





#### Level 3 - Version control

- Software used can be shown to be exactly the same that passed levels 1 and 2
- Responsibility
  - Vendor (*CM and VC*)
  - Officials
  - Auditor





## **Level 4 - Controlled functionality**

- Able to demonstrate
  - Resistant to tampering
  - Empty electronic ballot box
  - Number of votes in electronic ballot box
  - Initial results
  - Secure transfer





## Level 5 - Integrity of votes

- None of the recorded votes are lost
- Only completed votes are recorded
- Electronic audit trail





## **Challenging the results**

• Manual election - leads to expensive recounts

• Electronic election - evidence is readily available from the electronic audit trail





## **Voting is not everything**

- Election set-up
- Inclusion of non-electronic votes
- Counting and reporting
- A 'closed system'





#### Making every vote count is important

#### Reflecting voters intentions

- Unintentional informal voting
- Accurate counting
- Long term consistency
  - ensuring democratic election principles continue to apply





### **Election Integrity**

- Privacy during voting
- Authentication of the votes
- Avoidance of coercion
- Empty ballot box at start of polling
- Security of ballots
- One vote per person





#### **Demonstrating Integrity**



Electronic

Paper	
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Minimum potential for error guaranteed if	Maximum potential for (human) error even with
Compliance with all 5 levels of transparency	Observation
– most easily achieved with use of high integrity language and application of sound software engineering principles, practices	Manual checking
and processes	Transparent process

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#### **Verifiability via Electronic Audit Trails**

- Design
- Development
- Closed system
- Independent auditing



